Background
In February 1998, the federal governmentís Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel issued its report on the feasibility of the ìconcept of deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel wastesî. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) had been directed by the governments of Canada and Ontario in 1978 to begin development of the concept. In 1989, the federal Minister of the Environment appointed an environmental assessment panel to conduct a review of the concept. Public hearings were held in 1996 and 1997.
Key conclusions of the report issued by the Panel (entitled ìNuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept, Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel, February 1998î) were that the safety of the AECL concept had not been adequately demonstrated from a social perspective and that the concept had not been demonstrated to have broad public support.
In December 1998 the federal government, through Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN), issued its response to the Panelís report. Their response which is entitled ìGovernment of Canada Response to Recommendations of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panelî was posted for a short time on the NRCAN web site. Additionally, public comments were solicited in January and February 1999.
The Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout along with other groups provided both oral and written interventions. The federal governmentís Response to the Panel Report is highly problematical for a number of reasons. Of particular concern is its reliance on a NRCAN developed policy document which was formulated with input from a narrow range of "stakeholders" (principally representatives of the Canadian nuclear industry and their counterparts in the federal bureaucracy). CNPís submission to Natural Resources Canada which follows below, addresses this and other issues.
Brief to Natural Resources Canada in connection with
the Government of Canada Response to the Panel Report on Nuclear
Fuel Waste
February 28, 1999
1.
Relation of 1996 Policy Framework for Radioactive Waste to GoC Response
2.
Concept of ìsustainabilityî as used in the GoC Response
3.
Nuclear Fuel Waste Management - ìAgencyî vs. ìOrganizationî
4.
Misinterpretation of Panel findings on technical safety of the AECL concept
5. Access to Information
6. Additional Public Consultation
7. Selection of preferred
option
8. Waste and Funding Liabilities
9. Conclusion
This brief, prepared by the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, is in follow up to the December 1998 Government of Canada Response (hereafter referred to as the ìGoC Responseî or ìResponseî) to the Recommendations of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel (hereafter referred to as the ìPanel Reportî).
A number of points raised in the GoC Response merit comment. Some key issues are addressed below.
1. Relation of 1996 Policy Framework for Radioactive Waste to GoC Response
The GoC Response to the Panel Report begins by citing the 1996 Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN)-developed Policy Framework for Radioactive Waste. The Policy Framework is cited throughout the Response document and serves as the foundation for the governmentís response to most of the Panelís recommendations (in several instances, the phrase ìConsistent with the Policy Framework for Radioactive waste...î serves as a preamble to the governmentís response to a panel recommendation). The prominence that the government gives to the Policy Framework is indicated by its inclusion in their response to Recommendation 1 of the Panel Report.
The Policy Framework document is clearly instrumental in framing the responses developed by NRCAN for the government. Yet this document, in spite of having been drawn up in 1996, prior to the issuance of the Panelís Report in March 1998 is clearly not part of the public review process that was undertaken in connection with the Panel Report. Rather, it was formulated in the absence of criteria such as full public participation and open scientific review.
In developing the discussion paper outlining the Policy Framework for the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Canada, Natural Resources Canada indicates that it consulted with representatives of 77 organizations (ìResults of Consultations with Major Stakeholdersî NRCAN document, October 1995). Of this number, 74 of these organizations represent government (federal/provincial) and nuclear industry (AECL, suppliers, industry industry groups, uranium mining companies) interests. Of the remaining three representatives, two were from academic institutions and the other from a business council. NRCAN chose to define its ìstakeholdersî in a manner far more restrictive then that of the nuclear fuel waste concept environmental assessment panel. There was no input into the discussion paper that forms the basis of the Policy Framework from environmental, church, social justice or other public interest organizations. Nor does there appear to have been any input from aboriginal organizations.
While there are elements of the Policy Framework which may have met with agreement from the excluded sectors, had they been consulted, there are other elements that are more problematical. This is particularly the case in those parts of the GoC Response where the Policy Framework is used as a rationale for limiting direct public and government oversight of the proposed Waste Management Agency.
2. Concept of ìsustainabilityî as used in the GoC Response
In responding to recommendation 1 of the Panel report the GoC Response reads in part: îResolving the nuclear fuel waste issue will further support nuclear energy, and particularly the CANDU option, as a sustainable electricity supply optionî.
The term ìsustainabilityî is not defined in the governmentís Response. In our view óa view that is arguably shared by a majority of observers outside of parts of the federal government and nuclear industry, the commonly understood definition of sustainable development would not include the ìCANDU optionî, even in the event that the nuclear fuel waste issue is ìresolvedî.
The principle of sustainable development as outlined in the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development of 1987 (the Bruntland Report) refers to development that ìmeets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needsî (Our Common Future, 1987)
Implementing a process that allows new waste to be stored at nuclear stations as older waste is moved offsite, does not render the process that continues to generate waste more ìsustainableî in the sense of being environmentally sound or safe. With an ongoing history of workplace and technical safety problems, scathing ìpeer reviewsî, routine emissions and leaks of radioactive materials, massive cost overruns and public debt and continued production of high level and other radioactive waste products, nuclear power generation compromises our present needs as well as those of future generations.
Perhaps this is why 81% of respondents in an Angus Reid Group poll undertaken earlier this month would prefer that Ontario use non-nuclear sources for electricity generation. The route to ìsustainable developmentî, as it is commonly understood, lies in the federal government, power utilities and others supporting safe, renewable sources of electricity generation and undertaking the phase out of nuclear power.
3. Nuclear Fuel Waste Management - ìAgencyî vs. ìOrganizationî
A principle concern of the Panel, as outlined in Recommendations 3.1 through 3.4 of their report is that the federal government establish a Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Agency at ìarms-lengthî from the utilities and AECL. The Panel recommends that the Agency be funded by the producers and owners of nuclear fuel waste, with a board of directors appointed by government which is representative of ìkey stakeholdersî.
The federal government responded to this recommendation by citing the 1996 Policy Framework as a rationale for stating that an organization (rather than a government established agency) should be set up by the owners and producers of nuclear fuel waste and that the owners and producers rather than ìkey stakeholdersî should name the board of directors. Further invoking the Policy Framework the government states that the owners and producers of nuclear fuel waste should appoint the advisory council.
It is appropriate that the owners and producers (including crown corporations and public utilities) of nuclear fuel waste retain liability for its management (see section 8 of this brief). The Panel found it appropriate that owners and producers be required to fund a Waste Management Agency. However, a number of points in NRCANís response on behalf of the government to Recommendations 3.1 to 3.4 of the Panel run counter to the public interest and to the intent of the Panel Report.
In its recommendations the panel clearly stated that the board of directors be representative of key stakeholders and that the advisory council represent a wide variety of parties. Vesting control of the board of directors and the advisory council with the nuclear industry by definition ensures that this will not happen. The governmentís proposed waste management agency is effectively stripped of multi-stakeholder and democratic aspects recommended in the Panel report.
A preferred approach would involve the government establishing the Waste Management Agency at ìarms-lengthî while ensuring that costs for fuel waste management and operations of the agency are financed through owners and producers.
It is our recommendation that:
- the Waste Management Agency be established by the federal government as an independent agency rather than an industry organization
- if the board of directors of the Agency includes representatives of owners and producers of nuclear fuel waste they not be in the majority
- the majority of board members not be employed or have fiduciary interests in the nuclear industry
- the majority of the advisory council not be employed or have fiduciary interests in the nuclear industry
- the agency undertake independent audits of the costs associated with management of nuclear fuel waste and have the legislative authority to require owners and operators to set aside those costs
- the agency be subject to review by the Auditor General and subject to the Access to Information Act
- the Agency report to a government department other than Natural Resources Canada so as to avoid a conflict of interest
- the Agency be required to report on an annual basis to Parliament and to the public
- all decisions taken by the board of directors and all recommendations made by the advisory council be made available to the public in a timely fashion.
With regard to a waste management fund it is our recommendation that:
- a dedicated fund financed by contributions from owners and producers of nuclear fuel waste be established.
- the fund be used for waste management and decommissioning
- the fund be managed by the Waste Management Agency
- the fund be subject to regular and comprehensive public audit
- access to the funds by owners and producers of nuclear fuel waste require approval of the Agency
- legal restrictions on the use and access to funds be established
4. Misinterpretation of Panel findings on technical safety of the AECL concept
As outlined in the response to Recommendation 7, the governmentís nuclear power ìsustainabilityî argument has been put forward concurrent with the assumption that the Panel found the AECL concept to be technically safe. It is an assumption which has been challenged by at least one member of the Panel. Earlier this month, Panel member, Senator Lois Wilson stated in the Senate of Canada:
ìI wish to say publicly that the government's response to the panel's findings do not reflect the nuances we wrote into that report. We did not say simply that the concept was technically safe. Our carefully crafted words reflected a more sophisticated approach that highlighted the fact that there is a point of view that believes the concept is not safe, and this is the important part of what I am saying. The panel report stated: Safety must be viewed from two complementary perspectives, technical and social. From a technical perspective, safety of the AECL concept has been, on balance, adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development but from a social perspective it has not.
In other words, the panel broadened the meaning of safety beyond the traditional meaning of technical safety and emphasized the experience and historical memory of people in assessing the concept from a social safety perspective.î (February 10, 1999, Senate of Canada)
An issue not addressed in the GoC Response to the Panelís recommendations concerning a Waste Management Agency is whether such an Agency would be covered by the federal Access to Information Act. (It is also an issue at the provincial level. Beginning on April 1, 1999 the generating and power distribution companies that result from the Ontario Hydro breakup will not be covered by the provinceís Freedom of Information Act.)
Presumably an industry-controlled organization of the sort described in the GoC Response would not be covered under the Act. It is not sufficient to rely on ìgoodwillî or ìvolunteerismî to ensure full disclosure of information. The record already demonstrates that this approach has not worked in the nuclear industry. The government has a responsibility to ensure that there are legislated requirements requiring disclosure of information and that any entity which is created to handle nuclear fuel waste be subject to the Access to Information Act.
6. Additional Public Consultation
The GoC Response to Recommendation 8 of the Panel Report, which refers to the means by which governments will take public preferences into account when examining options for the disposition of nuclear fuel waste, fails to explicitly endorse public participation.
In what appears to be a repeat of the approach used in developing the 1996 Policy Framework, it is stated that NRCAN will ìinitiate a consultative process with appropriate federal departments, the Atomic Energy Control Board, producers and owners of nuclear fuel waste, the provinces, and other stakeholders to develop options...î (the wording is also used verbatim in section 9).
No mention is made in this statement of inviting participation from the public or public-interest groups. Given the exclusionary approach used by NRCAN in their consultations around development of the 1996 Policy Framework, it is reasonable to ask whether the phrase ìother stakeholdersî will be narrowly interpreted by NRCAN to exclude the public and public interest groups.
The Policy Framework was developed using an closed process at odds with the more inclusive one used in the development of the Panel Report. Its invocation in the governmentís Response to the Panel Report does a disservice to the federal governmentís oft-stated commitment to transparency and openness on issues of major public policy.
7. Selection of preferred option
The GoC Response states that the Minister of Natural Resources will report back to Cabinet within twelve months. How will the preferred option be determined? What process will be undertaken? Will NRCAN undertake additional consultations with ìstakeholdersî during this period? If so, will stakeholders include members of the public and public interest organizations?
8. Waste and Funding Liabilities
There appears to be broad philosophical agreement that the Canadian nuclear industry should be held accountable for the management of its nuclear waste. However, the fact that nuclear utilities and AECL are so intertwined with government policy and the public purse raises a number of questions. What are the implications in Ontario, where Ontario Hydro is being broken up and the public will be left with Ontario Hydroís billions of dollars of nuclear debt? Will AECL contribute towards the waste fund? If so, where will their revenues come from? Will the electric power utilities in Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick raise their rates? Nuclear reactor sales have proven to be not only unsustainable from an environmental standpoint, but also fiscally non-viable, as demonstrated by the utilities accumulated nuclear debt and the need to offer significant loan/subsidies to prospective buyers of CANDU reactors.
Currently the Ontario and Qu*bec governments guarantee the debt of their electric power utilities. From 2000 on, the Ontario government has indicated that they will not guarantee the debt of the company (Ontario Power Generation Inc.) that will take over Ontario Hydroís generating stations.
The GoC response to the Panel recommendations does not directly deal with this issue. However it is clearly of no small significance. Will Ontario Power Generation Inc. be responsible for nuclear fuel waste? Are the provinces ultimately responsible for the liabilities? What is to stop a private entity from simply walking away from its liabilities? What role will historical liability play in forthcoming legislation?
Can the federal government walk away from its role in creating the conditions which had led to this massive liability? Recent news reports indicate that the government is concerned about being left with the economic liability associated with nuclear waste. (ìLiberals warned not to risk managing nuclear wasteî, Ottawa Citizen, February 19, 1999, p. A3) The focus in the GoC Response on an industry-controlled Waste Management Organization as opposed to an independent Waste Management Agency created by the government may be one indication of the governmentís concern about the liability issue (so too were the repeated statements from NRCAN staff during the recent ìopen housesî that the federal government will not be responsible for waste liability).
The possibility that federal and provincial governments have not sufficiently planned for funding shortfalls is reflected in the Panel report which states, ìThe panel remains unconvinced that sufficient financial resources are being collected and protected. No independent audit has been conducted to provide confidence that sufficient funds are and will continue to be available.î
The GoC Response to the Panel Report as drafted by NRCAN needs to be
reassessed in light of the issues left unaddressed. NRCAN and by extension
the federal government need to fully and objectively evaluate the governmentís
role in creating policies that have led to the present nuclear waste problem
and place the interests of the environment and health of Canadians at the
forefront of any recommendations brought forward to cabinet. These recommendations
should include a commitment to phase out sources of nuclear fuel waste
including nuclear power reactors.
cnp@web.net