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Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean
The Case Against Turkeyís Akkuyu Nuclear Plant


by David H. Martin, Research Director, Nuclear Awareness Project
June 2000

Download the full report here (106 pages, Acrobat PDF format, 1012K)

Read the July 25, 2000 media release: 'Turkey Cancels Akkuyu Nuclear Plant'
 

Executive Summary

In December 1996, the Turkish state electrical utility TEAS invited bids from foreign reactor vendors for the construction of a 100% financed nuclear power station to be built at Akkuyu Bay on Turkeyís Mediterranean coast. Three nuclear vendors are bidding to build the plant: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL); Nuclear Power International (NPI, a partnership between Siemens of Germany and Framatome of France); and Westinghouse/Mitsubishi (UK/USA/Japan).

Ironically, Turkeyís latest attempt to start a nuclear program comes just as most of the developed world has stopped building new nuclear plants and has opted for cheaper, cleaner, and safer generating options such as renewable energy and high efficiency natural gas. Nuclear power is plagued by high cost, erratic performance, endemic technical problems, the risk of catastrophic accidents, and environmental problems such as routine radiation releases and radioactive waste management. World nuclear power use is expected to peak in 2002, and then begin a period of sustained and permanent decline. Reliable independent cost studies show that nuclear power plants are about twice as expensive to build and operate as high-efficiency natural gas generating plants. Canada has been forced to temporarily shut down one third of its own nuclear power reactors because of poor performance, bad management and safety problems. CANDU reactors have the worst performance among competitive reactor designs, yet AECL is trying to sell this flawed technology to countries in the developing world.

Turkeyís state utility TEAS vastly overestimates electricity demand over the next twenty years, and does not take into account the effects of electricity sector restructuring. As electricity prices rise to reflect the phase-out of historic subsidies, demand will be moderated. Private sector projects will easily meet new demand without requiring an expensive and risky nuclear power plant. An Integrated Resource Plan can determine the right balance of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, which are cheaper, cleaner and safer than nuclear power. Turkey has the historic opportunity to ëleapfrogí ahead of other countries with efficiency programs and renewable energy development, and by avoiding the disastrous mistake of building nuclear power plants in the first place.

Turkey has made five attempts to start a nuclear power program, beginning in the 1960s. The selection of the winning nuclear vendor to build the Akkuyu plant was first supposed to have been made in June 1998. Between then and April 2000, the selection announcement was delayed at least 8 times. There has been increasing opposition in Turkey to the proposed nuclear plant at Akkuyu Bay. That opposition includes local citizens who depend on the land and the sea for their livelihoods, as well as members of the intelligentsia and nuclear establishment itself.

Some of Turkeyís most prominent earthquake experts are demanding a halt to the nuclear plant until further research is conducted on the Akkuyu area. The death of over 18,000 people in the Izmit earthquake is a tragic testimony to the human cost of poor planning and inadequate regulation. The Turkish government and the nuclear vendors are conspiring to cover up the real earthquake risk at the Akkuyu site. An earthquake is the most likely cause of a catastrophic nuclear accident at Akkuyu. Such an accident could have devastating consequences for the 165 million people in the eastern Mediterranean region. The Akkuyu nuclear plant, if built, will also aid in the extinction of one of the worldís most critically endangered species, the Mediterranean Monk Seal, of which there are only 50 to 100 individuals left in Turkey.

The dark underside of nuclear power has always been its potential for nuclear weapons proliferation, either through the production of plutonium -- an inevitable byproduct of reactor operation -- or through the transfer of sensitive nuclear information, technology and materials. Turkeyís nuclear program will fan the flames of the nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Turkey has also been implicated in nuclear arms aid to Pakistan. An earlier attempt to build an Argentinean-designed reactor was likely aimed at plutonium production for nuclear weapons. Evidence of nuclear smuggling based in Turkey, and Turkeyís push for its own nuclear fuel capability and indigenous reactor design, all point to possible nuclear weapons development. The support of prominent Turkish citizens for nuclear weapons development lends credence to this evidence.

Turkey has a long history of gross human rights abuses, which include systematic widespread torture and murder of prisoners in custody; death squad murders; disappearances; restrictions on freedom of speech; and incommunicado detention without legal representation. Despite the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and his ceasefire call, human rights improvements have been minimal. Incidence of torture actually worsened in 1999 as compared to the previous two years. Restrictions on free speech and overt political repression have continued despite pressure on Turkey to meet western standards in order to join the European Union.

Turkish political history over the last 40 years has been characterized by a series of unstable governments, interrupted at intervals by four military coups dí*tat ó in 1960, 1971, 1980, and most recently in June 1997, when the government of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, was forced out of office. Allegations of corruption at the highest levels have added to this political instability, which has been accompanied by economic instability. Inflation has averaged more than 80% per year over the last ten years, and the national debt is over $100 billion (US). It remains to be seen if the current $4 billion (US), three-year anti-inflation program sponsored by the International Monetary Fund will succeed. Five similar programs in the 1990s failed, and many Turks believe that the cure may be worse than the disease.

Financially, the Akkuyu deal carries risks for both the vending countries and Turkey. In Canada, the government is prepared to provide $1.5 billion (CDN) in government funds to finance the Canadian component (35%) of AECLís bid. The governments of AECLís other partners will be providing funds through their respective state export/import banks. Similar arrangements will take place in other vendor countries. The $3 billion (US) deal is too big and too risky for commercial banks to even consider making the loans. This deal is also a problem for Turkey, where the treasury department has recently stalled the deal because it does not want to provide a sovereign (state) guarantee for the loans. Westinghouse has said that it is willing to proceed without a Turkish guarantee (at least initially). It is not clear if the other vendors are willing to do likewise.

There are many good reasons why the nuclear vendors and their governments should withdraw their bids to build the Akkuyu nuclear plant. Similarly there are many good reasons why the government of Turkey itself should stop the Akkuyu project. Simply put, nuclear power is an outdated technology that is very expensive, and carries real safety, environmental, and security risks. Renewable energy, conservation programs, and high efficiency natural gas plants are cheaper, cleaner and safer. A nuclear power program will only interfere with the hard road ahead for Turkey in building a sustainable energy future, healing its economy, democratizing its political system, and improving its human rights record.


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