Canada's Nuclear Policy and Proliferation Risks

Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout /
Campagne contre l'expansion du nucléaire

February 19, 1998

Introduction
1. Canadian Uranium Exports: For peaceful purposes only?
2. CANDU exports: Proliferation Risks
3. Plutonium Fuel Imports: A Threat to Non-Proliferation
Recommendations

The problem with Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy is that fundamentally it does not work. Over the past 50 years, Canada's role as an "honest broker" in efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament has been continually compromised by its efforts to promote civilian nuclear programs at home and abroad. Federal and provincial efforts to market CANDU reactors and uranium under the guise of the "peaceful atom" actually contribute to a reduction in global security.

The immediate risks are apparent in the potential for Canadian uranium to find its way into weapons of mass destruction and the inherent environmental and proliferation hazards associated with nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons waste. An open and independent evaluation of industry practices and its impact on these issues has yet to be initiated by the Government of Canada.

By continuing to support an unsustainable industry, we place our environment and our security at risk. Successive governments have continued to unconditionally support the objectives of the Canadian nuclear industry and have failed to hold crown agencies and other parts of the industry publicly accountable. This is exemplified by our continued commitment to uranium exports, CANDU reactor exports and weapons plutonium imports.

1. Canadian Uranium Exports: For peaceful purposes only?

The nuclear fuel chain begins with uranium which has only two principal uses: nuclear bombs and nuclear electricity generation.

From the beginning, Canadian uranium and nuclear expertise was used to produce nuclear weapons. The atomic bombs dropped on Japan used uranium from Canada and the Congo, refined at Port Hope Ontario. Canada's uranium was sold explicitly for nuclear weapons from 1942 to 1965. Historically, Canada's uranium literally helped to fuel the nuclear arms race.{1}

Since 1965, Canada has had a policy of selling uranium for peaceful purposes onlyÐthat is, as fuel for nuclear reactors. Any country purchasing Canadian uranium or a Canadian nuclear reactor must promise not to use it or its byproduct plutonium, for bombs. This policy is complemented by an international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, as the Indian experience shows, this policy cannot be enforced. If a country chooses to make bombs with Canadian nuclear materials or technology, there is nothing Canada can do to prevent it. In fact, as many critics have pointed out, Canadian uranium still finds its way into bombs.

In its October 1993 report, the Joint Federal-Provincial Panel on Uranium Mining Developments in Northern Saskatchewan noted:

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which Canada is a signatory, prohibits the use of uraniumSfor military applications. However, there is no process whereby exported Canadian uranium can be separated from uranium derived from other sources. Therefore, no proven method exists for preventing incorporation of Canadian uranium into military applications.

Current Canadian limitations on end uses of uranium provide no reassurance to the public that Canadian uranium is used solely for non-military applications by purchasers. The panel wishes to bring concerns related to the possible use of Saskatchewan uranium for weapons to the attention of the government. (emphasis in the original) {2}

This concern was reinforced when an official with the Atomic Energy Control BoardÐin reply to a question on the possible use of Canadian uranium in French nuclear weapons tests in the South PacificÐ stated, "it's like when you put money in the bank and you go recover it later. You're not necessarily going to get the same dollar back." {3}

Our uranium is linked to weapons programs in other ways as well. The U.S, for example, mixes its depleted uranium (including that of Canadian origin) together for the manufacture of weapons-grade plutonium and bomb components. And even if Canada's exported uranium were actually separated and reserved exclusively for civilian use, it still would help nuclear weapons countries to divert uranium from other sources for military use.

Thus, CanadaÐeven after 1965Ðhas continued to play a role in the nuclear weapons initiatives of countries like France, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

History demonstrates all too well that nations, particularly those with a commitment to military expansion, often ignore agreements they have signed. At best, Canada's position on possible military end uses of uranium is naive and ignores the reality of the situation. At worst, it is a cynical public relations ploy intended to justify the interests of a coddled and insular nuclear industry.

Joint Federal-Provincial Panel on Uranium Mining Developments, 1993

2. CANDU exports: Proliferation Risks

Every CANDU reactor produces plutonium which can be used for nuclear bombs at any time in the next twenty thousand years. In other words, long after the reactor that produced it has been shut down, decommissioned or forgotten, and long after the regime that signed a nuclear cooperation agreement has been consigned to history, the plutonium will still be available for weapons use.

Proponents of CANDU reactor sales have stated that Canada's nuclear program is dedicated to peaceful purposes only and that bilateral agreements and the NPT ensure this. However, this position cannot alter the viability of reactor plutonium for use in nuclear weapons nor the tendency, as noted earlier, of militarily aggressive countries to violate their written agreements. As early as 1976, weapons experts noted that civilian, "reactor-grade" plutonium can be used in weapons and that the concept of it's not being suitable for weapons is "fallacious." {4}

Similarly, in 1994, the National Academy of Sciences stated that it would be quite possible for a potential proliferator to make a nuclear explosive from reactor-grade plutonium using a simple design that would be
assured of having a yield in the range of several kilotonsÐmore if an advanced design was used. {5}

In addition, CANDU reactors have on-line refuelling capacityÐthe reactor continues to operate while fuel is being removed and inserted. This makes it much more difficult to determine if spent fuel is being removed and used to make plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Despite Canadian and international non-proliferation agreements, CANDU sales carry an inherent risk of proliferationÐpurchasers can simply ignore their commitments, as India did. All of Canada's past and present CANDU customers (China, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Romania, Argentina, and South Korea) have at one time or another pursued nuclear weapons programs.

AECL's most recent sales target, Turkey, is believed to be undertaking a clandestine nuclear weapons program. In the mid-1980s Canada withdrew an earlier bid to supply CANDU reactors to Turkey, partly "in response to pressure from Western countries which [are] concerned that Turkey may build a nuclear bomb based on CANDU technology" {6}

Despite Turkey's observation of the non-proliferation principles, there have also been allegations in the past regarding nuclear proliferation connections with Pakistan.

In 1995, a Greek foreign ministry official, Thanos Dokos repeated concerns about "nuclear cooperation between Ankara and Islamabad... and reports that Turkey might try to acquire nuclear weapons material and technology and recruit nuclear scientists from the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union." {7}

The proliferation concerns associated with China's nuclear program are also problematic. China has been providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan and Iran, both 'threshold' nuclear weapons states.

China is currently building a 300 MW reactor in Pakistan. The chairperson of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Ishfaq Ahmad Khan, has stated that knowledge from the Chasma plan and the KANUPP

reactorÐsold to Pakistan by CanadaÐwill enable Pakistan to launch an indigenous nuclear power program, although foreign assistance will be needed with "a few more nuclear power plants." {8}

In 1992, allegations were raised that China was transferring ballistic missile technology to Pakistan. There have also been allegations that China is helping Pakistan build a plutonium production reactor at Khusab, and an associated plutonium separation facility. {9}

In January 1996, evidence collected by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) revealed Chinese aid for Pakistan's uranium enrichment program at Kahutua for nuclear bombs. {10}

China has also been accused of supplying Iran with guided missile and nuclear weapons technology. {11}

Remarks made at the National Forum on Climate Change (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy) Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, Ontario, February 16, 1998.

Radioactive Swords into Radioactive Ploughshares

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and Ontario Hydro are proposing to import reactor fuelÐmade with plutonium from dismantled warheadsÐfrom the U.S. and Russia to use in CANDU reactors. Ontario Hydro proposes to use this plutonium fuel in its reactors at the Bruce Nuclear Power Development on the shore of Lake Huron.

In January 1997, the U.S. Department of Environment (DOE) announced that it would study a two track approach to deal with its 50 metric tons of "surplus" weapons plutonium.

One track would study the option of vitrifying plutonium. This process involves mixing the plutonium with liquid high-level nuclear wastes and molten glass. The second track involves converting the plutonium into an oxide chemical form and mixing it with uranium oxide to fabricate a mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for nuclear reactors.

The federal governmentÐwithout any significant public or parliamentary debateÐhas agreed in principle to allow the import of this plutonium fuel. The government and the Canadian nuclear industry portray the proposal as a "swords into ploughshares" initiative which will make productive use of dismantled weapons. However, the government has failed to commit to a full public policy review or to undertake a comprehensive environmental assessment before a final decision to proceed with the proposal.

The government and industry claim that plutonium fuel imports into Canada are a positive step for world peace, turning weapons into electricity. However, this rationale for pursuing the plutonium import scheme can be viewed as mere camouflage. The global nuclear industry is in decline and Ontario Hydro is no exception. {12} They are using the "swords into ploughshares" argument as a marketing tool in the effort to revive a scandal-plagued and debt-burdened industry, as well as provide a rationale to refurbish Ontario Hydro's ailing reactors.

Evidence of this underlying motive can be seen in that the weakest North American utilities are the ones pushing to use plutonium fuel. Commonwealth EdisonÐa U.S.electric utility which has six of its 12 reactors on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's "Watch List" because of dismal safety recordsÐis heading up the lead consortium for MOX use in the United States.

Similarly in Canada, seven of Ontario Hydro's reactors are slated for early shutdown due to safety problems. Moreover, Ontario HydroÐwhich has postponed the reactor repairs and retubing required at Bruce A in light of the delays in the plutonium fuel initiativeÐobviously hoped to use the initiative to finance the $1 billion refurbishing costs. {13}

The recent Ontario Hydro scandal has raised questions about both the safety of CANDU reactors and the credibility of the Canadian nuclear industry. Given the substandard state of affairs at Ontario Hydro, it needs to be asked: How can the federal government, and by extension the people of Canada, put any confidence in the nuclear industry's capability to implement a plutonium program of this nature given self-acknowledged managerial incompetence and design and safety problems inherent in Canada's aging nuclear infrastructure?

The plutonium fuel initiative would link civilian and military nuclear programs

By accepting plutonium from nuclear weapons for use in commercial reactors, the plutonium fuel initiative would further blur the world's civil and military nuclear programs.

The RAND CorporationÐa Washington D.C.-based think tankÐhas stated that "it is critical that countries pay attention to the proliferation threat from the civilian side if they want to maximize the non-proliferation value of dismantling U.S. nuclear weapons and those of the Former Soviet Republics. If countries ignore the civilian threat, they can compound the problem by making wrong choices in how to deal with military materials." {14}

The use of plutonium fuel made from U.S. and/or Russian nuclear weapons would integrate Canada into their nuclear weapons programs by:

- making Ontario Hydro a commercial recipient of military fissile material;

- undertaking security measures within Canada for fissile plutonium of foreign origin; and

- providing radioactive waste disposal for foreign decommissioned nuclear weapons.

As well, Canada's Nuclear Non-Proliferation policy is intended to isolate the Canadian nuclear industry from the nuclear weapons programs of other countries. The spirit of this policy would be violated by the import of weapons plutonium fuel.

Weapons plutonium is not eliminated when "burned" in nuclear reactors

The plutonium in the MOX fuel will not be completely eliminated as the spent MOX fuel would still contain between 40 and 70 percent of the original amount of plutonium. {15}

A U.S. National Academy of Sciences study, indicates that a fresh weapons plutonium MOX fuel element would contain 25 kilograms of plutonium. The same element, after irradiation to a burn-up of 40 megawatt-days per kg heavy metal, would contain 18 kilograms of plutonium. {16}

Creating a Plutonium Economy

Canada's support in principle for the import of plutonium fuel sends a signal to the world that the commercial use of plutonium fuel is acceptable. Commercial trading in plutonium brings with it tremendous environmental and public health hazards, as well as global security risks. Instead of working to eliminate these risks, Canada would be helping to initiate a plutonium economy.

Approximately 80 percent of the world's plutonium exists in civilian stockpiles and that amount is increasing faster than military stockpiles. The weapons plutonium initiative could launch a plutonium economy in Canada, resulting in the widespread use of plutonium as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. A plutonium economy would increase the risk of nuclear accidents, nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear war.

Rogue states could claim to be importing plutonium for their civilian nuclear programs and then divert it for military purposes. The United Nations Development Program admits that "it is difficult to imagine human institutions capable of safeguarding these plutonium flows against occasional diversions of significant quantities to nuclear weapons." {17}

There a number of examples of plutonium gone missing during MOX fuel production:

- In December 1997, it was reported that a MOX fuel rod had been lost at a French nuclear research centre near Grenoble. After six months of searching, the fuel rod could still not be accounted for. {19}

- In 1994, 70 kilograms of plutonium was unaccounted for at the MOX plant in Japan. {20}

- The Physicians for Social Responsibility state that, "in the large scale reprocessing plants and MOX fuel plants in England and France, it is even possible that some 3.3% of the plutonium can go missing, without any alarm being raised. On a throughput of 1,600 tons of spent fuel and 16,000 kg of plutonium per year...this means that each year 528 kg of plutonium can be missing without anybody noticing." {21}

Canada: Nuclear dump site?

The precedent set by this initiative may turn Canada into an international nuclear waste dump site. If the plan is approved, plutonium fuel would be transported into Canada from the U.S. in heavily armed truck convoys once a month for at least 20 years. The plutonium fuel from the former Soviet Union would arrive through the St. Lawrence Seaway or by air. {22} This used fuel would remain in Canada forever, in the form of high-level nuclear waste.

By accepting plutonium from the U.S. for commercial use, existing free trade agreements may prevent Canada from limiting or prohibiting further shipments of nuclear waste. An Ontario Hydro official has even admitted the difficulty of gaining public acceptance for the initiative because many may "...(view) Canada as the dumping ground for what has been billed as 'the most toxic substance known to mankind.""{23}

Erosion of Civil Liberties

The security precautions needed to transport plutonium fuel, which is still defined as weapons useable, will erode Canadians' civil liberties due to the additional security along the transport route and at the utility site. Canadians will be hit with the costs of these added security measures.

The civil liberties of Canadian citizens could be profoundly effected by the extreme anti terrorist measures that may become necessary. In the name of national security, CSIS and the RCMP could be given almost unlimited surveillance powers to deal with potential plutonium theft.

In the U.S., non-violent protests against nuclear shipments have resulted in lengthy jail sentences and security personnel are authorized to use deadly force. Of major concern is the American tendency to insist on extraterritorial application of their laws.

The U.S. National Academy of Sciences has stated that, because of the threat of theft by terrorist, shipments of plutonium fuel will require security measures equivalent to those needed to transport nuclear weapons.

Alternatives

There are other options to render weapons plutonium inaccessible without the need for long distance transportation or plutonium reprocessing. Immobilization, defined as converting the plutonium into a stable and proliferation-resistant form is a quicker and safer process. {24} The Rand Corporation even states that it is less expensive than MOX. {25}

Although immobilization is a promising alternative, it would still require great vigilance to ensure that the plutonium does not enter the environment.

Ultimately, to increase global security, protect the environment and public health all plutonium separation should be stopped, civilian use of plutonium fuel should be forbidden, and existing plutonium should be immobilized and guarded under very strict international security regime.

International Opposition to the Plutonium Fuel Option

There is mounting global opposition to the plutonium fuel option as exemplified in January 1997, when 171 environmental, peace and medical organizations condemned the U.S. government's decision to pursue the plutonium fuel option. The groupsÐfrom every corner of the world, including CanadaÐstated that the MOX fuel approach would increase the international trade in plutonium, create even hotter high-level radioactive waste and provide a disincentive for non-proliferation efforts around the globe.

The Test Burn

If the next phase of the project goes forward, weapons plutonium fuel may be transported to Canada for tests at Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories this spring. The tests will serve as the first step before approval is given for future large-scale plutonium shipments.

Howard Canter, acting director of U.S. DOE's Office of Fissile Materials, has confirmed that the first shipment of U.S. weapons plutonium will proceed sometime in March or April 1998. {26} The shipment has been delayed several times. It was to go forward in December 1997, however, it was held up due to difficulties in the preparation of the U.S. Environmental Assessment (EA).

This most recent delay is in response to issues raised by CNP and other Canadian groups that made submissions to the DOE on the draft EA. A number of submissions cited the lack of environmental assessment in Canada and transboundary effects (impacts on one country that result from events in another). U.S. officials found that provisions of American legislation governing transboundary impacts and the transport of nuclear materials were not accounted for in the draft EA. The DOE, Department of Justice and the Council on Environmental Quality are revising the Environmental Assessment. To date, there has been no equivalent assessment in Canada.

The first shipment from the U.S. will contain only 150 grams of plutonium, but it will set a dangerous precedent. Conducting this test burn may create so much institutional momentum that Canada will be unable to back out of the process at a later date.

Even Ontario Hydro's enthusiasm for the CANDU MOX initiative appears to be declining. Hydro's executive vice-president, John Fox, was recently quoted as saying, "The discussions are ongoing, but I'm not overly optimistic much is going to happen.S I just can't imagine someone backing a large appropriation (through Congress) to send money to Canada when there's a whole bunch of U.S. suppliers who say they can do it." {27} Despite such statements, the test burn is still planned.

It is unacceptable for this project to be considered, let alone proceed, without proper public consultation in Canada. As stated in the U.S. Environmental Assessment, "activities conducted in Canada would be the responsibility of the Canadian government". {28} To date, the only opportunity Canadians have had to comment has been through the current US environmental assessment process. Although the DOE's Environmental Assessment stops at the border, any accident resulting in plutonium dispersal into the environment is unlikely to similarly respect national boundaries.

The federal government has stated that any environmental assessment of the plutonium import plan would be "several years away". However this would be too little too late and does not address the fundamental question of whether or not Canadians even want to embark upon this process.

Recommendations

In order to increase global security, protect the environment and preserve public health:

- Canada should strengthen its nuclear non-proliferation policy and examine the links between civilian and military nuclear programs. No nuclear cooperation should be permitted with known or suspected proliferators.

- Uranium and CANDU exportsÐespecially to countries with nuclear weapons programs and those known or suspected to be involved in proliferation activitiesÐshould be ended. Canada's global responsibilities and long-term economic, environmental and security interests outweigh the short-term interests of a non-sustainable industry.

- The federal government should cancel the spring test-burn of plutonium fuel at Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories.

- The federal government should withdraw the offer to import weapons plutonium into Canada.

- The federal government should support the isolation and careful safeguarding of the plutonium already created.

- Government policy should treat plutonium, not as an energy source, but as a hazardous waste and a security risk.

- The transportation of plutonium fuel through our country and the development of a global plutonium economy should be explicitly opposed.

- The federal government should work towards ending plutonium production worldwide.

- Parliamentarians should call for a joint Standing Committee (Environment, Foreign Affairs, Health) review of our nuclear policy with broad public participation and cross-Canada hearings.

{1}
Gordon Edwards, "Canada's Nuclear Industry and the Myth of the Peaceful Atom" in Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum (eds) Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race (Toronto, Lorimer) 1983

{2}
Joint Federal-Provincial Panel on Uranium Mining Developments in Northern Saskatchewan; Uranium Mining Developments in Northern Saskatchewan: Dominique-Janine Extension, McLean Lake Project, and Midwest Joint Venture, October 1993, p. 26.

{3}
Randy Burton, "Is Sask. Uranium in French Bombs - There's no way to know officials say", Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, September 7, 1995.

{4}
Selden, "Reactor Plutonium and Nuclear Explosives," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1976.

{5}
The Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences;Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy Press, 1994.

{6}
"Canadian firm drops bid to build nuclear plant", Nuclear Developments, February 25, 1988, p. 39.

{7}
Thanos Dokos in "Greece", in Harald Muller, ed., Nuclear Export Controls in Europe, Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1995, p. 208.

{8}
8 Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, "Officials say Pakistan developing nuclear manufacturing capability", Nucleonics Week, June 1, 1995, p. 15.

{9}
China challenges U.S. data pointing to Pakistan aid", Nucleonics Week, February 22, 1996.

{10}
"China said aiding Kahuta project; U.S. Credits, NPT Status on line", Nucleonics Week, February 8, 1996. p. 1.

{11}
Robert Sheppard, "CANDUs for China? Hold on There", Globe &;Mail, Nov. 7, 1994, p. A13.

{12}
In 1996, on the 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl meltdown, the Washington D.C.-based Safe Energy Communication Council released a study which found that the global nuclear power industry has suffered from dismal growth, mounting premature and permanent reactor closures, and daunting safety, economic and proliferation problems that plague even the much touted commercial nuclear programs in France and Japan. Safe Energy Communication Council, "International Nuclear Power" Washington,, Spring 1996

{13}
Ray Silver, "Hydro puts off Bruce retubing as hope for Pu mission fades," Nucleonics Week, August 15, 1996, p. 8

{14}
Limiting the Spread of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material, RAND Corporation, 1993.

{15}
Arjun Makhijani "Technical Aspects of the Use of Weapons Plutonium as Reactor Fuel" SDA, Vol. 5, No 4, IEER, 1997.

{16}
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options, 1995, Table 6-5, p. 270.

{17}
Energy After Rio: Prospects and Challenges, UNDP, 1997, p.16.

{18}
The Plutonium Threat, Nuclear Control Institute, 1997. Available at http://www.nci.org/nci/nci-plu.htm.

{19}
WISE Paris, "France: Experimental MOX Fuel Rod Lost at Research Institute" WISE News Communiqué 485, January 23, 1998 p. 14.

{20}
The MOX Myth: The dangers and risks of the use of mixed oxide fuel, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 1997.

{21}
ibid.

{22}
AECL Technologies Inc., Plutonium Consumption Program - CANDU Reactor Project, July 31, 1994, p. 5-3.

{23}
"Ontario Hydro Nuclear Eyes PU as Way to Save Bruce-2", Nucleonics Week, December 22, 1994.

{24}
Edwin Lyman "Weapons Plutonium: Just Can It", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 1996.

{25}
Limiting the Spread of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material, RAND Corporation (1993), p. xii.

{26}
"MOX assemblies to Canada next spring, says DOE", Nuclear Materials Monitor, Dec. 23, 1997.

{27}
Tom Spears, "Hydro unlikely to win plutonium project", The Ottawa Citizen, December 10, 1997, p. B3.

{28}
US DoE Parallex Draft Environmental Assessment, August 1997, Section 2.1, Description of the Proposed Action.