Media Release
For release Friday, September 3, 1999
 

Ottawa -- Environment groups are condemning the plan to proceed with the import of weapons plutonium fuel (MOX) into Canada and calling on the federal government to cancel both the test phase and full-scale project. Yesterday, the federal government confirmed that weapons plutonium will shortly be transported from the United States and Russia into Canada for testing purposes at the Chalk River nuclear site.

ìIím shocked that the Chrétien government chose to give the go-ahead to the transport of this material without any environmental assessment, community consultation or parliamentary debate,î says Elizabeth May, Executive Director of the Sierra Club of Canada. ìThe government has chosen to spin its failure to undertake an environmental assessment by pointing to Chalk Riverís site license and by providing a brief public comment period for AECLís transportation and emergency response preparations. Instead it should cancel the project.î

Brennain Lloyd, a spokesperson for Northwatch, an environmental coalition whose member groups include people who live in and around Sault Ste. Marie (the transit point selected for U.S. plutonium) states, ìThis material is extremely hazardous, and will be for thousands of years. Plutonium is not only dangerous from an environmental and health perspective, but also in terms of the civil security measures that will be necessary to protect the shipments from terrorist action.î

ìIn the face of all the evidence and mounting opposition from independent observers both in Canada and internationally, itís astounding that the government is pushing this plan. This is a make work project for AECL at taxpayers risk and expense,î says Kristen Ostling, National Coordinator of the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout. Ostling notes that the use of MOX fuel in CANDU reactors will not eliminate the plutonium. A significant portion of the original weapons plutonium remains in the fuel waste. Moreover, the International Association of Fire Fighters, mayors of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence region, disarmament, environmental, medical organizations as well as an all-party parliamentary committee have voiced opposition to the plan.

Ostling adds, ìApparently, the government is basing its disarmament policies on nuclear industry advice. Itís like asking the tobacco industry about smoking and Canadian health policy. If Canada truly wants to help, it should assist with securing the plutonium, immobilizing it and push for the end of plutonium production. The federal government owes it to Canadians to follow the advice of the parliamentary committee, cancel the test and scrap the larger project.î

Dr. Gordon Edwards, president of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility states, ìItís a national disgrace that we are going into the twenty-first century with the same degree of secrecy and stupidity surrounding nuclear policy decisions, as we have experienced in the twentieth century. Enough is enough, letís stop the test, letís stop the plan.î
 

For further information please contact:

Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, 613-789-3634
Northwatch, 705-497-0373
Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, 514-489-5118
Sierra Club of Canada,, 902-428-2789
Energy Probe, 416-964-9223

TEN REASONS TO JUST SAY NO TO WEAPONS PLUTONIUM FUEL
 

1. Plutonium is a nuclear explosive material. It should be immobilized and guarded as a uniquely dangerous waste. Encouraging commercial traffic in plutonium is irresponsible. For 25 years, top-level policy reports have warned against using plutonium as a reactor fuel, because of the dangers of stimulating a global ìplutonium economyî. If plutonium is used by many countries as reactor fuel, it will be impossible to prevent it from being diverted for bombs.

 
2. As Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. reports, if 100 tonnes of plutonium were used to fuel CANDU reactors, more than 60 tonnes of plutonium would remain in the used nuclear fuel -- enough to build over 10,000 nuclear weapons. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences states that the long-term security problem of guarding this residual plutonium is no different from that needed to guard the original weapons plutonium (after immobilization).

 
3. The security measures necessary to safeguard the import of plutonium will affect the civil liberties of ordinary Canadians. Shipping tonnes of weapons-usable plutonium fuel over Canadian roads for a period of two or three decades will require security measures equivalent to those needed for the transport of intact nuclear weapons, according to senior US scientific advisors. The origins, political beliefs, personal circumstances and international connections of those living along the transportation routes may have to be investigated.

 
4. In April 1996, without any mandate from the population, his party or Parliament, Prime Minister Chrétien declared that Canada favours ìin principleî the idea of importing tonnes of excess weapons plutonium from the USA and Russia to fuel CANDU power reactors. The first shipments, for ìtest purposesî, are scheduled to take place sometime in 1999. Yet Canadians have never been consulted on the fundamental policy question: Should weapons plutonium be imported into Canada? In addition, citizens along the transport routes have not been officially told whether plutonium fuel will be transported through their communities, nor have they been assisted to educate themselves on the long-term implications of this proposal.

 
5. No country or international agency has asked Canada to accept excess weapons plutonium -- only the Canadian nuclear industry has done so. The industry is hopeful that importing plutonium fuel will serve to prop up Canadaís declining nuclear industry. Ironically, the four Bruce ìAî reactors originally identified as the best candidates for using plutonium-based fuel, were all shut down by Ontario Hydro in 1997, and will require billions in repairs to keep them operating for another 25 years (as the proposal suggests). Under the plutonium import plan Canada will be committed to run specific reactors for decades, even if cheaper and safer energy alternatives are available.

 
6. The plutonium from the dismantled weapons constitutes a dangerous long-lived waste from the weapons programs of Russia and the U.S. By importing this material we would be burdening future generations of Canadians for tens of thousands of years. This could be the first step in a long term policy of importing other countries nuclear waste at the behest of the Canadian nuclear industry.

 
7. The transportation of plutonium fuel in Canada poses a potential health and safety risk. The U.S. Department of Energy has identified a credible accident scenario that would result in the packaged fuel bursting open, catching fire, and spreading plutonium into the atmosphere in respirable form. If even a small amount of plutonium is dispersed into the environment there could be serious, long lasting consequences. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a Nobel-prize-winning organization, has estimated that 27 micrograms of insoluble plutonium-239 in the lungs would be sufficient to cause cancer in an adult human being. 100 grams is equivalent to 100 million micrograms.

 
8. When weapons-derived plutonium is used to fuel a power reactor, the main objective is not so much to destroy the plutonium, as to mix it with other highly radioactive materials (fission products) thereby making it relatively difficult to extract the plutonium for weapons purposes. But the same objective can be met without the need for long distance transportation or civilian plutonium traffic. This approach, called immobilization, involves mixing the weapons-derived plutonium with liquid high-level nuclear wastes (fission products) and casting the mixture into large, highly radioactive glass logs weighing two tonnes each. The RAND corporation states that this option would be less expensive than the plutonium fuel option.

 
9. The plutonium fuel test burn scheduled for this year at Chalk River Nuclear Labs will add significantly to the existing institutional momentum for the project. This momentum has been building steadily since 1994, when AECL published its first report advocating the plutonium import approach. An environmental assessment for the test burn, or for the transport of plutonium fuel, has never been undertaken in Canada, although such an environmental assessment was considered necessary in the U.S.. The Canadian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Natural Resources have promised that there will be some kind of environmental assessment before Canada embarks upon the full-scale project; however, under existing legislation, an environmental assessment panel cannot be mandated to address the fundamental policy question as to whether Canada should become involved in the import of plutonium fuel.

 
10. Contrary to the federal governmentís response in April 1999 to a Parliamentary Committee (which had deemed the AECL plutonium plan to be ìtotally unfeasibleî) there is no precedent anywhere in the world for using weapons-grade plutonium in MOX fuel. Although nuclear advocates have pointed out that some European countries have considerable experience using commercial plutonium MOX fuel, none of those countries have used weapons-grade plutonium. At the same time, the fact that several countries are already using plutonium-based fuel highlights the aforementioned dangers of stimulating a global plutonium economy. By legitimizing the commercialization of plutonium, the AECL MOX plan runs the risk of helping to institutionalize plutonium fuel worldwide, thereby not only perpetuating but seriously exacerbating the associated proliferation problems.

Produced by the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility and Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, September 1999

Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, e-mail: ccnr@web.net, website: www.ccnr.org
Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, e-mail: cnp@web.net, website: www.cnp.ca

Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout
cnp@web.net